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Response
Vasant A. Sukhatme
I welcome the opportunity to respond to the remarks of Thandika
Mkandawire, although I confess at the start that I am not an Africa
expert and do not have any special qualifications to speak on globalization issues. I will say, however, that I have long believed that many
kinds of topics often benefit from the perspective of a novice, and I
hope you will agree by the end of my remarks that “Globalization and
Africa’s Unfinished Agenda” is one such topic. I am, by profession, an
applied microeconomist with a research interest in economic development, so I shall bring the tools of that “trade” to address the topic at
hand.
The ten poorest countries in the world, measured in terms of purchasing power parity estimates of income per capita, are in sub-Saharan Africa: they are Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania, Madagascar,
Malawi, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Chad, and Niger. The total combined
population of these countries is about 140 million, which is about one
third that of all of sub-Saharan Africa. Although these countries are all
poor, they do not represent a homogeneous group. For one thing, they
range in population from less than five million to more than fifty million. Compared to any other group of countries or any other continent
— and in stark contrast to all of them — Africa as a whole has experienced economic decline, which began in the mid-1970s. This is what is
beneath the refrain that Africa has been marginalized. Gross domestic
product per capita in several large African countries has declined from
the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. In the last year or so, however, several
African countries have experienced significant positive economic
growth. Nonetheless, a larger fraction of the population in Africa as
compared with any other major part of the world seems to be below
the poverty line, regardless of how we define or draw that line.
This tragic state of affairs is a commentary on the lives of hundreds
of millions of people. It is also the context in which I frame my remarks
as I respond to Mr. Mkandawire. I believe it is important to understand, as best as we can, the fundamental reasons behind the state of
affairs in Africa. If we can begin to understand the causes of Africa’s
ills, we can better understand what economic steps must be taken to
reverse the continent’s decline.
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Among the many things African nations have in common are
economies that are small in size, with low average incomes. However,
Africa is a continent of enormous size and a great deal of diversity.
There are major differences across the continent in terms of agroclimatic conditions and natural and human resources. There is considerable variation in economic performance across sub-Saharan Africa. For
example, Niger and Togo experienced substantial declines of per
capita income between 1985 and 1994, whereas in that same period
countries such as Mozambique and Uganda grew more than 2 percent
per year in per capita terms. Bear in mind the implication of this: a
country growing at 5 percent a year will double its income every fourteen years, whereas a country growing at 1 percent a year will take five
times as long, or seventy years, to double its income. I would be
remiss, however, if I did not also note that Botswana and South Africa
are relatively well-to-do, with average incomes seven times greater
than the group I listed at the beginning of my remarks. Botswana and
South Africa have roughly similar per capita incomes, but Botswana is
only 1/25th the size of South Africa. Further, two other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa (Gabon and Cameroon) are considerably better off
than the average of the ten poorest countries I listed.
*****
After briefly summarizing the conclusion I reached from Mr. Mkandawire’s essay, I will offer my own view of the causes of Africa’s lagging economic performance. I understood Mkandawire to say that the
international financial institutions in Africa have not served Africa’s
economic interests well. A corollary of this message is that the problems of Africa must be seen in a global context, which is to acknowledge that globalization is harming Africa. Mkandawire appears to
argue that the globalization of Africa is largely driven by the international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, and that the benefits of globalization have
yet to reach Africa. Further, he argues that if African countries cannot
fashion the right response to the external forces of globalization, then
for Africa it will be an “immiserizing” globalization. Finally, he argues
that internal institutional and political weaknesses and the particular
way Africa is being integrated into the global system are likely to lead
to this undesirable outcome.
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My approach differs from the one Mkandawire adopts, but I believe
it also complements his. I want to emphasize issues that are internal to
the structure of African countries but I admittedly do not know
enough about African nationalism to do justice to his comments on
that subject. Instead, I will take the approach which I am most qualified to do, as an applied microeconomist.
Africa is the only part of the world where foreign economic assistance flows exceed by a large margin private-capital flows. In that
sense, one can say that Africa is aid-dependent. In my view (and that
of many other economists), aid has failed in Africa and so has aid conditionality. But I want to emphasize that development has not
occurred in Africa because aid has failed. In fact, aid is not a key or
even a major determinant of economic development. If anything, aid is
but a small part of the explanation of why development has failed in
Africa. Economists studying the economic impacts of foreign aid have
generally concluded that aid is beneficial when the economic-policy
environment of the aid recipient is conducive to economic progress.
Where aid has flowed into environments with inferior economic policy, there have been, under conditionality, attempts to induce good
policy environments. That is part and parcel of the business of foreign
aid.
It appears to be generally accepted that, because Africa is so greatly
aid-dependent, it is a pawn of the IMF and the World Bank. But surely
this grossly overstates the situation. While aid conditionality sounds
ominous on paper, it does not actually amount to much of a burden. In
fact, as the economist Ravi Kanbur has recently noted, it is likely that
the desk officer at the Fund or the Bank of an aid-receiving country
that violates conditionality will look the other way rather than put a
stop to the flow of aid funds.1 If the loan officer at the Bank or the Fund
does not keep aid funds flowing, then his own position at that institution is at stake. Because this is the heart of the agency problem that
haunts the aid business, in practice, aid conditionality has turned out
to be neither particularly onerous nor effective. In light of this, it is difficult to understand why the concept of conditionality raises the ire of
so many people, but it explains, in large measure, why bad policy environments have persisted. Aid flows have not helped in the development of Africa and have not helped in the development of useful
economic policies.
In spite of what many may believe, economists have learned an
enormous amount in the last five decades about what kinds of eco-
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nomic policies are necessary to stimulate economic growth and development. Rapid population growth in many countries and external constraints — such as adverse terms of trade for some countries and the
slow growth of output in industrialized countries leading to decreased
demand for primary products from Africa — have all contributed to
Africa’s faltering economic performance. The major culprits, however,
have been domestic-policy failures, including the bias against agriculture in price policy, tax policy, and exchange-rate policy.
In an important recent volume, Thomas Tomich, Peter Kilby, and
Bruce Johnston propose that a broad-based development strategy
must involve the following: incentives, institutions, infrastructure, initiative, inputs, and innovations.2 These strike me as particularly applicable to the African context. The structure of agricultural prices
provides the incentive structure, which, in turn, affects the inducement
to innovate and to invest in private and perhaps even in public irrigation. Attention to these fundamentals must be adequately paid if the
agricultural potential of Africa is to be realized.
I dwell on the agricultural sector because this is where the bulk of
the population of sub-Saharan Africa derives its livelihood, and this is
the sector that contributes the majority of the region’s aggregate measured output. I also want to address two very important sets of relative
prices that play a crucial role in the economic-development process.
Economists have learned much about the agricultural sector, and we
know a lot about what it takes to foster rapid agricultural growth and
what the consequences are of government intervention for agriculture.
Governments have intervened in every aspect of agriculture in nearly
all countries, from outputs to inputs, from domestic marketing to
international agricultural trade, and from staple food products to
fibers and livestock.
In recent years, the work of, among others, Krueger, Schiff, and
Valdes has advanced our techniques for understanding agriculturalpricing policies by emphasizing that a comprehensive evaluation of
the effects of pricing policies must incorporate both direct agricultural
sector interventions and indirect interventions, primarily via the real
exchange rate and protection to domestic industry.3 Direct interventions include price policies that suppress output prices below worldmarket levels, taxes on the export of agricultural commodities, and
tariffs and other restrictions on the importation of inputs such as fertilizer and machinery. Indirect interventions include economywide
import-substitution policies, the overvaluation of real exchange rates
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that arise from high rates of domestic inflation, and lags in adjusting
the nominal exchange rate. According to the estimates of Krueger and
his colleagues, direct interventions in agriculture result in a tax on
agriculture that is only about one-fourth of the total tax on agriculture
due to direct and indirect interventions. Despite the accumulated
weight of evidence on the ill effects of such price interventions, however, many countries continue to intervene in the agricultural sector.
*****
I’d like to briefly address the two sets of relative prices I mentioned
earlier. The terms of trade are defined as the ratio of the price of a
country’s export products to its import products. Mkandawire argues
that changes in the terms of trade for African countries, particularly
after the Asian financial crisis began in mid-1997, demonstrate the
fragility of African economies and their vulnerability to external factors. Sub-Saharan Africa’s principal exports are cocoa, coffee, cotton,
copper, and oil, all of which are extremely vulnerable to price risk as
well as exchange-rate and interest-rate risk. The terms of trade are particularly important to those countries whose foreign trade is large relative to national output, because changes in the terms of trade may have
a large impact upon the balance of payments and national income.
The terms of trade for African countries show considerable fluctuation over the last three decades. There are frequent, often sharp
increases in the terms-of-trade index, as well as frequent decreases.
The prolonged debate about the long-term trend in the terms of trade
for developing countries continues to this date. For some countries and
periods of time, the trend in that variable is downward, and for other
countries and periods of time, the trend has been upward. Whether
upward or downward, the trend is not pronounced. For example, over
the last twenty-five years in Ghana, the number of years when there
was an upturn has been roughly equal to the number of years there
was a downturn. The impact of movement in the terms of trade on the
trade balance and the rate of growth of real GNP is also somewhat
unclear. In the context of Africa, however, I want to link movements in
the terms of trade to agricultural development. Suppose the terms of
trade move adversely, and capital transfers, including foreign economic assistance, do not sufficiently increase to compensate for these
adverse terms of trade, thereby reducing the import capacity in many
countries. If imports of agricultural inputs, fuel, and spare parts for
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trucks and transport equipment fall, this can adversely affect the rural
sector. Further, the reduced imports of fuel and spare parts raise the
internal purchasing and marketing costs of government agencies. As
official agencies purchase fewer crops, the producer price of both food
and export crops falls. Mkandawire is right, then, when he claims that
these changes alter the terms of trade. However, his point is incomplete. Since the terms of trade can also rise, to the extent that government purchasing agencies prevent any rises in the prices that
producers receive, governments prevent the benefits of globalization
from reaching the farmer. A mix of macroeconomic policies and the
use of stabilization funds and other financial-market instruments can
ameliorate some of the impact of commodity price fluctuations on
national economies.
Finally, let me comment on the exchange rate, which is merely the
price of a unit of foreign currency in terms of local currency. A mispricing of the exchange rate distorts the price mechanism and will affect
the allocation of resources and, in turn, the growth of income. For
example, in the early 1980s, because of highly distorted exchange rates
(which were, in effect, a tax on exports), huge amounts of cocoa were
smuggled out of Ghana and into the neighboring countries of Togo,
Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast. A rise in the world price of cocoa,
unaccompanied by a corresponding rise in the internal price of cocoa,
led Ghanaian producers to smuggle cocoa to the neighboring countries
for sale abroad. Measured Ghanaian exports fell, as did GDP, even
though actual exports, including smuggled exports, rose.
Obviously, there is no magical recipe for development that countries of varied historical, social, cultural, political, or economic backgrounds can follow. There is, however, a growing body of evidence
arising from the experiences of a growing list of countries, that suggests connections between what policy-makers in those countries
chose to do to their economies and the consequences of their actions. In
country after country, government interventions have had unanticipated consequences and attempts to deal with those consequences
ended with denials of the key role of markets and prices. Economic
growth will occur even where some important policy lessons are violated, but it will not occur where there is wholesale violation of these
lessons.
Overall, I am optimistic about Africa’s future. A growing number of
countries have undertaken policy reforms, and many appear ready to
open up markets and grant the private sector a larger role in resource
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allocation. The growth record has improved in several countries, as
well. It must be remembered, of course, that economic policy reforms
without any underlying political and social change will not bring
about any significant improvement in the lives of millions of Africans.
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